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O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge:   
I. Introduction 
Ashley Gager brought suit against Dell Financial 
Services alleging that Dell violated the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 
227(b)(1)(A)(iii), by using an automated telephone dialing 
system to call her cellular phone after she revoked her prior 
3 
express consent to be contacted.  Gager contends that the 
District Court improperly dismissed her complaint for failure 
to state a claim on the theory that she could not revoke her 
consent once it was given.  We agree with Gager.  Therefore, 
for the reasons that follow, we will reverse the judgment of 
the District Court and remand this case  for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
II. Background 
Around December 2007, Gager applied for a line of 
credit from Dell to purchase computer equipment.  The credit 
application required that she provide her home phone number.  
Gager listed her cellular phone number in that place on the 
application.  In doing so, however, she neither stated that the 
number was for a cellular phone, nor did she indicate that 
Dell should not use an automated telephone dialing system to 
call her at the number she provided.   
 
Dell granted Gager a line of credit, which she used to 
purchase several thousand dollars worth of computer 
equipment.  Gager subsequently defaulted on her debt.  Dell 
then began using an automated telephone dialing system to 
call Gager‟s cellular phone, leaving pre-recorded messages on 
her voicemail concerning the debt.  In December 2010, Gager 
sent a letter to Dell, listing her phone number and asking Dell 
to stop calling it regarding her account.  The letter did not 
indicate that the number was for a cellular phone.  Gager has 
alleged that, after receiving her letter, Dell called her cellular 
phone approximately forty times over the three week period, 
using an automated telephone dialing system. 
Gager filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Wayne County, Pennsylvania, asserting violations of 47 
4 
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), the TCPA‟s provision banning 
certain automated calls to cellular phones.  Gager alleged that, 
after receiving her letter, Dell had an obligation under the 
TCPA to cease all autodialed calls to her cellular phone 
because she had withdrawn her prior express consent to be 
contacted at that number via an automated dialing system.  
The case was subsequently removed to the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.   
 
Dell moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  The District Court 
granted the motion, holding that Gager could not revoke her 
prior express consent for three reasons.  First, the court 
concluded that the lack of language in the TCPA providing 
for “post-formation revocation of consent” weighed in favor 
of finding that no such right exists.  Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., 
LLC, No. 11-cv-2115, 2012 WL 1942079, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 
May 29, 2012).  Second, the District Court held that, although 
Gager was entitled to give “instructions to the contrary” as to 
whether Dell could use an automated telephone dialing 
system to call her, those instructions had to be “provided at 
the time [she] . . . „knowingly release[d]‟ her telephone 
number” to Dell.  Id.  Finally, the District Court determined 
that, because calls regarding debt collection are not subject to 
the TCPA and because Dell‟s calls were for debt collection 
purposes, Gager failed to allege a violation of the TCPA.  Id.  
Gager appealed.   
 
III. Standard of Review 
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
5 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  We exercise plenary review over 
an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  W. Penn Allegheny 
Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010).  
We also exercise plenary review over issues of statutory 
interpretation.  United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 156 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
 
IV. Discussion1 
We are asked to resolve two issues today:  (1) whether 
the TCPA allows a consumer to revoke her “prior express 
consent” to be contacted via an automated telephone dialing 
system on her cellular phone and (2) if a revocation right 
exists, whether there is a temporal limitation on that right.  
Neither the Third Circuit nor any other appellate court has 
addressed either issue.  Our analysis of the scope of the 
TCPA is guided by the text of the statute, the FCC‟s 
interpretation of the statute, the statute‟s purpose, and our 
understanding of the concept of consent as it exists in the 
common law.  See Restrepo v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 617 F.3d 
787, 793 (3d Cir. 2010).  Considering all of these factors, we 
conclude that Gager has stated a plausible claim for relief 
because (1) the TCPA affords her the right to revoke her prior 
express consent to be contacted on her cellular phone via an 
autodialing system and (2) there is no temporal limitation on 
that right. 
Congress passed the TCPA to protect individual 
consumers from receiving intrusive and unwanted calls.  See 
Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 745 (2012).  
                                              
1
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
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The relevant portion of the TCPA provides that it is unlawful 
for any person:  
 
to make any call (other than a call made for 
emergency purposes or made with the prior 
express consent of the called party) using any 
automatic telephone dialing system or an 
artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any 
telephone number assigned to a paging service, 
cellular telephone service, specialized mobile 
radio service, or other radio common carrier 
service, or any service for which the called 
party is charged for the call. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).  Notably, the 
statute does not contain any language expressly granting 
consumers the right to revoke their prior express consent.   
 
Congress authorized the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to implement rules and regulations 
enforcing the TCPA.  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2).  Under its rule-
making authority, the FCC has stated that autodialed calls—to 
both cellular phones and land-lines—are lawful so long as the 
recipient has granted “permission to be called at the number 
which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.”  
In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd. 
8752, 8769 ¶ 31 (Oct. 16, 1992) (emphasis added) 
(hereinafter the 1992 Ruling).  The 1992 Ruling, however, 
left unresolved the question of whether instructions to the 
contrary may be given after a consumer has granted her prior 
express consent and, if so, whether there is any temporal 
limitation on the right to revoke prior express consent. 
7 
 
The most significant guidance from the FCC on the 
issue of revocation of prior express consent comes from a 
decision issued after the District Court dismissed Gager‟s 
claim.  See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations 
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991, SoundBite Communications, Inc., 27 FCC Rcd. 15391 
(Nov. 26, 2012) (hereinafter SoundBite).  In SoundBite, the 
FCC issued a declaratory ruling to resolve the issue of 
whether “a consumer‟s prior express consent to receive text 
messages from an entity can be construed to include consent 
to receive a final, one-time text message confirming that such 
consent has been revoked.”  Id. at 15395 ¶ 9.  The FCC 
concluded that a text message confirming an opt-out request 
is permissible under the TCPA.
2
  Id. at 15394 ¶ 7, 15398 ¶ 15. 
 
Although the FCC‟s analysis in SoundBite was 
directed at the use of an automated dialing system to confirm 
an opt-out request, rather than whether an opt-out right exists, 
the decision indicates that the FCC supports Gager‟s 
argument that a consumer may revoke her prior express 
consent once it is given.  The decision in SoundBite starts by 
noting that “neither the text of the TCPA nor its legislative 
history directly addresses the circumstances under which 
prior express consent is deemed revoked.”  Id. at 15394 ¶ 8.  
The FCC then noted “that consumer consent to receive . . . 
messages is not unlimited.”  Id. at 15397 ¶ 11.  Consistent 
                                              
2
 The TCPA‟s prohibition on automated dialing applies to 
both voice calls and text messages.  SoundBite, 27 FCC Rcd. 
at 15392 ¶ 2; see also Satterfiled v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 
569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] text message is a 
„call‟ within the meaning of the TCPA.”). 
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with this notion, the FCC stated several times that a consumer 
may “fully revoke[]” her prior express consent by 
transmitting an opt-out request to the sending party.  Id. at 
15397 ¶ 11 n.47; see also id. at 15394 ¶ 7 (stating that a 
consumer may “request that no further text messages be 
sent”); id. at 15398 ¶ 13 (noting that a consumer may opt out 
of receiving voice calls after prior express consent has been 
given).   
 
The remainder of the analysis in SoundBite focuses on 
why permitting a text message confirming an opt-out request 
would be harmonious with the TCPA‟s objectives, a concern 
not germane to this appeal.  Thus, notwithstanding the fact 
that SoundBite principally addresses an unrelated issue, the 
decision demonstrates that the FCC endorses two important 
points:  (1) a consumer may revoke her informed consent 
once it has been given, see id. at 15397 ¶ 11 n.47, and (2) 
there is no temporal limitation on when a consumer may 
revoke her prior express consent by sending an opt-out 
message, see, e.g., id. at 15398 ¶ 13 (suggesting that, after a 
consumer has received text messages, she may then send a 
request for those messages to stop at any time); id. ¶ 15 
(same). 
 
Dell‟s principal argument is that the TCPA‟s silence as 
to whether a consumer may revoke her prior express consent 
to be contacted via an autodialing system supports the 
conclusion that the right does not exist.  The District Court 
adopted the same reasoning, as have several other district 
courts.  See Gager, 2012 WL 1942079, at *4-5; Kenny v. 
Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, No. 10-cv-1010, 2013 
WL 1855782, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013); Saunders v. 
NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468-69 (E.D.N.Y. 
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2012).  We disagree.  Although the TCPA does not expressly 
grant a right of revocation to consumers who no longer wish 
to be contacted on their cellular phones by autodialing 
systems, the absence of an express statutory grant of this right 
does not mean that the right to revoke does not exist.  
  
Dell‟s argument relies on a comparison of the rights 
granted in the TCPA with the rights granted in other 
consumer protection statutes.  The gist of Dell‟s argument is 
as follows:  the TCPA does not contain an express provision 
authorizing a consumer to revoke her prior express consent to 
receive autodialed calls to her cellular phone.  Yet, Congress 
has passed several other remedial consumer protection 
statutes—most notably the 1977 amendments to the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the CAN-SPAM Act of 
2003, and the Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005—containing 
statutory avenues for a consumer to stop unwanted 
communications and solicitations.
3
  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) 
(FDCPA); 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(3)(A)(i) (CAN-SPAM Act); 
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii) (Junk Fax).  The passage of 
these statutes shows that—both before and after the passage 
of the TCPA in 1991—Congress was willing and able to 
create revocation rights in consumer protection statutes.  
According to Dell, the incongruity between these statutes and 
the TCPA supports the conclusion that the TCPA does not 
permit a consumer to revoke her prior express consent once it 
has been given.   
 
                                              
3
 Dell‟s submissions to this Court discuss only the FDCPA.  
However, the express statutory revocation right granted in the 
Junk Fax statute and CAN-SPAM Act also support Dell‟s 
argument.   
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However, we conclude that the absence of an express 
statutory authorization for revocation of prior express consent 
in the TCPA‟s provisions on autodialed calls to cellular 
phones does not tip the scales in favor of a position that no 
such right exists.  We reach this conclusion for three reasons.  
First, our understanding of the common law concept of 
consent shows that it is revocable.  Second, in light of the 
TCPA‟s purpose, any silence in the statute as to the right of 
revocation should be construed in favor of consumers.  
Finally, the FCC‟s decision in SoundBite provides further 
evidence that we have reached the correct result in this case. 
  
Our holding that the TCPA allows consumers to 
revoke their prior express consent is consistent with the basic 
common law principle that consent is revocable.  “[W]here 
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning 
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the 
statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate 
the established meaning of these terms.”  Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999).  Here, we conclude that 
Congress did not intend to depart from the common law 
understanding of consent because the statute does not treat the 
term differently from its common law usage.  Under the 
common law understanding of consent, the basic premise of 
consent is that it is “given voluntarily.”  Black‟s Law 
Dictionary, 346 (9th ed. 2009); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 892 (“Consent is a willingness in fact for conduct to 
occur.”).  Further, at common law, consent may be 
withdrawn.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A, cmt. i 
(1979) (“[C]onsent is terminated when the actor knows or has 
reason to know that the other is no longer willing for him to 
continue the particular conduct.”); see also United States v. 
Greer, 607 F.3d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing a 
11 
criminal suspect‟s right to withdraw consent to a search); 
Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (discussing the common law right of a proprietor 
to revoke consent for a patron to enter a store).
4
  
Consequently, based on the common law, we hold that the 
TCPA allows consumers to revoke their prior express 
consent. 
 
Our decision is also in line with the purpose of the 
TCPA.  The TCPA is a remedial statute that was passed to 
protect consumers from unwanted automated telephone calls.  
See S. Rep. 102-178, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1972; see also Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 
954 (discussing TCPA‟s purpose of curbing calls that are a 
nuisance and an invasion of privacy); SoundBite, 27 FCC 
Rcd. at 15391-92 ¶ 2 (discussing TCPA‟s purpose of 
protecting consumers against unwanted contact from 
automated dialing systems).  Because the TCPA is a remedial 
statute, it should be construed to benefit consumers.  See 
Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 
997 (3d Cir. 2011) (construing the FDCPA broadly to effect 
its purpose).  As a result, we should interpret in Gager‟s favor 
any silence in the TCPA as to a revocation right.  See Beal, 
2013 WL 3870282, at *13-17 (holding that absence of a 
                                              
4
 Two district courts have relied on the same common law 
understanding of consent in holding that the TCPA allows 
consumers to revoke their prior express consent.  See Beal v. 
Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., --- F. Supp. 2d ---, No. 12-
cv-274, 2013 WL 3870282, at *14-15 (W.D. Wis. June 20, 
2013); Adamcik v. Credit Control Servs., Inc., 832 F. Supp. 
2d 744, 749-50 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 892A cmt. i). 
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statutory revocation right in the TCPA does not preclude 
consumers from revoking prior express consent); Adamcik, 
832 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (noting that, if Congress wanted to 
limit a consumer‟s right to revoke consent under the TCPA, it 
should have done so in the statute).  Therefore, the TCPA‟s 
silence as to revocation should not be seen as limiting a 
consumer‟s right to revoke prior express consent.  Instead, we 
view the silence in the statute as evidence that the right to 
revoke exists. 
 
Finally, we cannot overlook the FCC‟s decision in 
SoundBite.
5
  The FCC‟s analysis on the revocation right is 
admittedly sparse, but its conclusion is clear:  consumers may 
revoke their prior express consent to be contacted by 
autodialing systems.  SoundBite, 27 FCC Rcd. at 15397 ¶ 11.  
                                              
5
 Gager argues that the SoundBite decision is entitled to 
deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Chevron 
deference appears to be inappropriate here because the FCC 
never articulated a rationale for deciding why the TCPA 
affords consumers the right to revoke their prior express 
consent.  Cf., e.g., Toussaint v. Attorney General of U.S., 455 
F.3d 409, 414-15 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that “meaningful 
review” by an agency was a prerequisite for Chevron 
deference).  Nonetheless, we will still afford some deference 
to the FCC‟s decision in SoundBite.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (“An agency 
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, 
given the specialized experience and broader investigations 
and information available to the agency and given the value 
of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings 
of what a national law requires.”) (internal citations omitted). 
13 
This conclusion is consistent with our common law analysis 
above.  It is also consistent with the TCPA‟s purpose.  The 
FCC‟s decision in SoundBite therefore serves as additional 
authority supporting our holding that a consumer may revoke 
her prior express consent.  
 
In sum, we find that the TCPA provides consumers 
with the right to revoke their prior express consent to be 
contacted on cellular phones by autodialing systems.  
  
Dell contends, however, that, even if the TCPA allows 
consumers to revoke their prior express consent, Gager had to 
deliver “instructions to the contrary” to Dell at the time she 
filled out the credit application.  In other words, Dell argues 
that the TCPA imposes a temporal limitation on when a 
consumer may revoke her prior express consent.  Again, we 
disagree.  Just as the TCPA is silent as to whether the 
revocation right exists, the TCPA also does not include any 
express language as to whether there is a temporal restriction 
on when a consumer may exercise her right to revoke her 
prior express consent.  Nevertheless, this silence does not 
mean that the TCPA should be interpreted as imposing a 
temporal restriction on the revocation right. 
   
The principal support for Dell‟s argument comes from 
the FCC‟s 1992 Ruling which states that “persons who 
knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given 
their invitation or permission to be called at the number 
which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.”  
7 FCC Rcd. at 8769 ¶ 31 (emphasis added).  According to 
Dell, this language means that instructions to the contrary 
may only be given at the time the consumer consents to 
receive autodialed calls.  Citing the identical portion of the 
14 
1992 Ruling, the District Court adopted the same argument.  
Gager, 2012 WL 1942079, at *6. 
 
We are not persuaded by such a narrow reading of the 
TCPA.  First, there is no indication in the legislative history 
that Congress intended for the statute to limit a consumer‟s 
rights by imposing a temporal restriction on the right to 
revoke prior express consent.  Indeed, the legislative history 
supports our view that express consent is revocable at any 
time because the TCPA was intended to protect consumer 
rights, not restrict them.  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 102-178 at 1-
2.  Moreover, as stated in the discussion above regarding the 
right to revoke prior express consent, we read the silence in 
the TCPA in favor of Gager because it is a remedial statute.  
See Lesher, 650 F.3d at 997.  
  
Additionally, the common law understanding of the 
notion of consent discussed above cuts strongly against Dell‟s 
argument that the revocation of prior express consent should 
be contingent on timing.  Instead, an individual should be 
allowed withdraw consent at any time if she no longer wishes 
to continue with a particular course of action.  See Adamcik, 
832 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 892A cmt. i).  Finally, the FCC‟s decision in SoundBite cuts 
strongly against Dell‟s position because the consumer‟s 
revocation of consent was effective well after the consumer 
consented to be contacted by an autodialing system.  
SoundBite, 27 FCC Rcd. at 15392 ¶ 4.  We therefore reject 
Dell‟s assertion that there is a temporal limitation on when a 
consumer may revoke her prior express consent. 
In addition to the legal arguments discussed above, 
Dell also asserts that the facts of this case do not state a cause 
of action under the TCPA for two reasons:  (1) the content-
15 
based exemption in the TCPA permitting autodialed debt-
collection calls precludes Gager from withdrawing her prior 
express consent and (2) equitable principles dictate that Gager 
should not be permitted to revoke her prior express consent.  
These arguments are unavailing. 
 
Dell argues that “[t]he relationship between the caller 
and the called as debtor/creditor is, in fact, dispositive” of the 
issue in this appeal because the TCPA‟s restrictions apply to 
telemarketers, not debt collectors.  This argument is 
misplaced because this distinction does not apply to calls 
made to cellular phones.   
 
At first glance, Dell‟s argument appears correct:  the 
FCC regulations implementing the TCPA permit certain types 
of autodialed debt collection calls, including calls similar to 
the ones at issue in this case.  See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. 
§ 64.1200(a)(2)(iii), (iv) (exempting calls “made to any 
person with whom the caller has an established business 
relationship” and calls “made for a commercial purpose [that 
do] not include or introduce an unsolicited advertisement or 
constitute a telephone solicitation”).  However, Dell fails to 
recognize that these exemptions do not apply to cellular 
phones; rather, these exemptions apply only to autodialed 
calls made to land-lines.  See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2).  
Therefore, the debt collection exemption invoked by Dell is 
not applicable in this case. 
 
Looking to the provisions of the TCPA that apply to 
autodialed calls to cellular phones and the exemptions 




  The statutory provision under which Gager 
brought her claim bans the use of “any automatic telephone 
dialing system” to call “any . . . cellular telephone service.”  
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).  The only 
exemptions in the TCPA that apply to cellular phones are for 
emergency calls and calls made with prior express consent.  
See id.; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii).  Unlike the exemptions 
that apply exclusively to residential lines, there is no 
established business relationship or debt collection exemption 
that applies to autodialed calls made to cellular phones.  Thus, 
the content-based exemptions invoked by Dell are inapposite. 
   
Finally, Dell invokes two equitable arguments in 
support of its position that Gager should not be able to revoke 
her prior express consent.  Neither argument has merit. 
First, Dell asserts that basic principles of contract law 
should preclude Gager from revoking her prior express 
                                              
6
 Dell argues that Gager‟s phone should be treated as if it 
were a land-line because she listed her cellular phone number 
as her home phone on the credit application she filed with 
Dell.  This argument is unavailing.  Callers have a continuing 
responsibility to check the accuracy of their records to ensure 
that they are not inadvertently calling mobile numbers.  See In 
the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 19 FCC Rcd. 
19215, 19219-20 ¶ 11 (Sept. 21, 2004) (declining to extend 
safe harbor provisions to calls made erroneously or 
inadvertently to wireless numbers); see also Breslow v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 
2012) (“[C]ompanies who make automated calls bear the 
responsibility of regularly checking the accuracy of their 
account records[.]”);  
17 
consent.  In short, Dell posits that a creditor will want to 
know in advance whether a credit applicant will consent to 
automated phone calls and that this knowledge is part of the 
“consideration” that the applicant offers in support of her 
application.  Although Dell is correct that the level of contact 
that a debtor will consent to may be relevant to the 
negotiation of a line of credit, the ability to use an autodialing 
system to contact a debtor is plainly not an essential term to a 
credit agreement.  More importantly, Dell‟s argument that its 
contractual relationship with Gager somehow waives her 
rights under the TCPA is incorrect.  The fact that Gager 
entered into a contractual relationship with Dell did not 
exempt Dell from the TCPA‟s requirements.  As discussed 
above, she retained the right to revoke her prior express 
consent.  
 
Dell also contends that it would be unfair to allow a 
consumer to revoke her prior express consent to be contacted 
on a cellular phone in the debt-collection context because the 
inability of a creditor to use an automated dialing system to 
call a borrower might make it “difficult, if not impossible, 
[for the creditor] to ever contact the borrower with regard to 
the credit it extends.”  This argument overlooks the fact that 
creditors are permitted to attempt live, person-to-person calls 
in order to collect a debt.  Consequently, Dell will still be able 
to telephone Gager about her delinquent account; the only 
limitation imposed by the TCPA is that Dell will not be able 




For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and remand this case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
